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We discuss the historical context for explorations of “pristine inner experience,” attempts
to apprehend and describe the inner experiences that directly present themselves in
natural environments. There is no generally accepted method for determining whether
such apprehensions/descriptions should be considered high fidelity. By analogy from
musical recording, we present and discuss one strategy for establishing experiential
fidelity: the examining of brain activation associated with a variety of experiential
perspectives that had not been specified at the time of data collection. We beeped
participants in an fMRI scanner at randomly-determined times and recorded time-locked
brain activations. We used Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) to apprehend
and describe the participant’s experience that was ongoing at each beep. These
apprehensions/descriptions were obtained with no specific theoretical perspective or
experimental intention when originally collected. If these apprehensions/descriptions
were of high fidelity, then these pairings of moments of experience and brain activations
should be able to be productively examined and re-examined in multiple ways and from
multiple theoretical perspectives. We discuss a small set of such re-examinations and
conclude that this strategy is worthy of further examination.
Keywords: descriptive experience sampling (DES), fMRI, pristine inner experience, fidelity, introspection
INTRODUCTION
A main theme (if not the main theme) of the (roughly 135 year) history of psychology
is what science should do about first-person reports of experience. The first third (roughly
1879-1925) of psychology’s history was marked by Introspection (spelled, as is usual for
that period, with a capital I to call attention to the systematic methodological characteristics
of the investigations conducted by Wundt, Titchener, Külpe, and others), as psychology
attempted to study directly the elements of consciousness. However, as is well-known,
the several Introspection laboratories failed to agree on fundamentally important issues
such as whether imageless thought existed (Lieberman, 1979). That disagreement left the
Introspectionists vulnerable to vitriolic attack from all sides: psychoanalysts held that important
processes were unconscious and therefore by definition non-introspectionable; behaviorists
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held that neither conscious nor unconscious contents were
publicly observable and therefore should be excluded from
science; the rising interest in individual differences undermined
the Introspectionists’ search for universal mental elements. For
those and other historical or systemic reasons (Danzinger, 1980),
by about 1925 Introspection as psychological method had gone
down in flames.
Psychological history’s second third (1925-1970) was
marked by the suppression of introspection. The behaviorists,
broadly speaking, had gained control of psychological science.
Introspection was so thoroughly discredited that the term was
never even mentioned in psychological-method textbooks in
this period except as the target of a historical condemnation
(Hurlburt et al., 2006). Explorations of private experience largely
disappeared from psychological science and mention of the word
“consciousness” became rare. However, it gradually seemed to
become apparent that private experiences (thoughts, feelings,
etc.) were fundamentally important features of the human
condition and that their radical exclusion by psychological
science was too extreme.
As the behaviorists lost their dominating grip, psychological
history’s third (1970-present) saw a resurgence in psychological
investigations of the human aspects such as thinking, feeling, self-
concept, and so on, that had been excluded during behaviorism’s
suppression. Psychology became “cognitive,” interested in mind,
mental contents, and mental processes (with textbook titles like
Cognitive Psychology: Connecting Mind, Research and Everyday
Experience (Goldstein, 2014) andCognition: Exploring the Science
of the Mind (Reisberg, 2015). Psychological investigations were
often performed using casual and untrained introspection
(now written with a lower-case i to contrast it with the
formal Introspection of the first third of psychology, and
often called “self-report”) that presumed that people had
straightforward access to their mental processes. However, these
new introspections were soundly criticized, for example, by
Nisbett and Wilson (1977), who concluded in a widely cited
review that
the accuracy of subjective reports is so poor as to suggest that
any introspective access that may exist is not sufficient to produce
generally correct or reliable reports (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977,
p. 233).
The behaviorists continued their criticism. Skinner, for example,
criticized mentalistic explanations of behavior:
I see no evidence of an inner world of mental life relative either
to an analysis of behavior as a function of environmental forces
or to the physiology of the nervous system. . . . The appeal to
cognitive states and processes is a diversion which could well
be responsible for much of our failure to solve our problems
(Skinner, 1977, p. 10).
Modern psychology has not resolved these criticisms, resulting
in a deep ambivalence about whether first-person reports should
be admitted as psychological data (Wooffitt and Holt, 2011).
Hurlburt andHeavey (2001) called it a chasm. On the one side are
those who, following the behaviorists, hold that introspection is
impossible—that first-person reports of inner experience cannot
be trusted and should continue to be excluded from scientific
consideration. Instead of asking people to describe directly their
mental processes, these investigators infer mental characteristics
based on the observation of non-introspective measures such as
reaction time, eye movements, and brain activity.
On the other side of the chasm are those who hold,
Skinner and Nisbett/Wilson notwithstanding, that introspection
is necessary, that first-person accounts reveal important
characteristics of people (and are even essential in understanding
psychopathology), and that first-person accounts are acceptable
within science. These psychologists aim directly at inner
experience, typically asking participants to fill out questionnaires
that enquire, for example, about: their experiences while having
undergone a resting state acquisition in a magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) scanner; the frequency of their rumination;
the frequency of their obsessive thoughts; their ability to
maintain self-worth; the characteristics of their inner speech,
of their non-judgmental mindfulness, or of their attitude
toward political involvement; or any of thousands of other
supposedly experiential features. These questionnaire reports are
validated in a variety of ways (e.g., by correlating with existing
questionnaires), often under the (usually unstated) belief that
establishing validity implies that the observations themselves are
of adequate fidelity.
Hurlburt and Heavey (2001) held that both sides of the
chasm deserve implementation. As the behaviorally inclined
suggest, modern psychology should profit from the painful
lessons of Introspection’s calamitous demise, as re-articulated
by Skinner (1977) and by Nisbett and Wilson (1977): there
is indeed good reason to distrust self-reports (Hurlburt and
Heavey, 2015). At the same time, however, inner experience
is indeed a defining aspect of the human condition, and
psychological science must use first-person reports of inner
experience—inner experience cannot be adequately inferred
from external measurements like reaction time. On that
view, psychological science should wrestle to the ground the
question: under what conditions should first-person reports
be held to be high fidelity accounts of inner experience?
However, rather than address the question, the two sides of the
chasm have largely gone their separate ways. Many cognitive
psychologists continue to downplay first-person reports,
whereas others continue to rely on first-person questionnaires
with little regard for the critiques from the other side.
KEY CONCEPT 1 | Inner experience
The phenomena (including seeings, hearings, inner speakings, thoughts,
tickles, sensations, feelings, etc.) that naturally present themselves as ongoing
and as directly apprehended (as “before the footlights of consciousness”)
at particular moments. Includes apprehensions of the external and internal
environments.
DESCRIPTIVE EXPERIENCE SAMPLING
This historical sketch, like any 1000-word sketch of a 135-year
period, is an oversimplification, and one could quibble about the
dates and so on. However, it sets the context for the explorations
of “pristine inner experience” (Hurlburt and Akhter, 2006)
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undertaken by Hurlburt and his colleagues, who have sought to
honor both sides of the first-person-report chasm by suggesting
that pristine experiences, the ongoing naturally occurring
thoughts, feelings, sensations, and so on that appear directly
“before the footlights of consciousness” (as James, 1890/1952,
p. 153 would say), are characteristically human experiences that
deserve to be considered by psychological science. Hurlburt and
his colleagues have advanced Descriptive Experience Sampling
(DES) method (Hurlburt, 2011; Hurlburt and Akhter, 2006;
Hurlburt and Heavey, 2006), which is an attempt at a procedure
that apprehends and describes pristine inner experience in high
fidelity. DES uses a random beeper to signal participants to attend
to their ongoing experience at the moment of the beep, and
coaches them in so doing using an iterative procedure (Hurlburt,
2009, 2011). They have argued that DES’s exploration of pristine
inner experience avoids the pitfalls that led to Introspection’s
demise by focusing on experience itself rather than searching for
elements that underlie experience (Monson and Hurlburt, 1993).
Furthermore, DES avoids the traps of mentalism and language
limitations described by Skinner (Hurlburt and Heavey, 2001).
And furthermore, Hurlburt and Heavey (2001) note that Nisbett
and Wilson specifically exempted DES-type investigations from
their condemnation of introspection:
We also wish to acknowledge that the studies do not suffice to
show that people could never be accurate about the processes
involved. To do so would require... theoretically interesting
procedures such as interrupting a process at the very moment it
was occurring, alerting subjects to pay careful attention to their
cognitive processes, coaching them in introspective procedures,
and so on (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977, p. 246).
(Further discussion of Nisbett and Wilson’s critique and
psychology’s over-generalization of it is in Hurlburt and
Schwitzgebel, 2007, and in Hurlburt and Heavey, 2001).
KEY CONCEPT 2 | Pristine
As it naturally occurs, undisturbed by the act of observation, not intentionally
manipulated. Pristine inner experiences are intimately personal, produced of,
by, and for the individual in the individual’s own manner. They can be simple or
complex, clean or messy. Pristine connotes natural and not specifically altered;
it does not connote clean or pure (a pristine forest is often mucky or brutal).
KEY CONCEPT 3 | Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES)
An attempt at apprehending and describing pristine inner experience in high
fidelity. Using a random beeper in natural environments, it explores ongoing-at-
the-moment-of-the-beep experience; an “expositional” interview then explores
and describes the experience. It is an evolving method and set of principles
aimed at submitting to the constraints that the exploration of experience
imposes.
KEY CONCEPT 4 | Apprehends
To grasp or make thematic some aspect or aspects of ongoing inner
experience. At any moment there are ongoing a welter of stimuli (inner and
outer, visual, auditory, imaginary, etc.) to which people are skillfully responsive
(not necessarily thematically). Out of that welter emerge one or a few directly
apprehended experiences; those are the pristine inner experiences.
KEY CONCEPT 5 | Iterative
The incremental acquisition of apprehensional and descriptive skill. DES holds
that all explorations of inner experience should be assumed to begin at low
fidelity or worse, and therefore obtaining high fidelity descriptions of inner
experience requires a method that trains successive approximations that
ultimately may become satisfactorily close to high fidelity.
Hurlburt (2011, chapter 17) made the provocative claim that
pristine inner experience is radically non-subjective—that is, it
is not the result of opinion or impression but instead is directly
apprehendable, as Skinner and the behaviorists required—and
has defended the adequacy of DES against skeptics, as inHurlburt
and Schwitzgebel (2007) and in Caracciolo and Hurlburt (2016).
If such claims and defenses are at least partially correct, then
science may have a way forward that escapes the experiential
chasm. Science, however, has yet to determine a way to evaluate
such claims; this paper is intended as a contribution.
PRISTINE EXPERIENCE
As defined by Hurlburt (2011) and Hurlburt and Akhter
(2006), pristine inner experiences are phenomena (including
thoughts, feelings, sensations, perceptions, etc.) that directly
present themselves as we navigate our way through our natural
environments. We spend our waking lives immersed in our own
experiences, so it might seem that we have privileged or infallible
access to our own pristine experience, but Hurlburt (2011) argued
that people are generally mistaken, and often grossly mistaken,
about the characteristics of their own pristine experience. For
example, Baars held that inner speech is ubiquitous (e.g., “Human
beings talk to themselves every moment of the waking day;”
Baars, 2003, p. 106), whereas DES investigations suggest that
many people talk to themselves never or almost never (Hurlburt
et al., 2013; Hurlburt and Heavey, 2015; cf. Alderson-Day and
Fernyhough, 2015).
Let us consider a few samples of pristine experience from
“Susan,” a participant in the resting-state functional MRI (fMRI)
study by Hurlburt et al. (2015). For now, let’s assume that this is
a high-fidelity description of Susan’s pristine experience—we will
return to the assumption of high-fidelity below.
1:52:12 pm (sample 5.1): [Susan is lying quietly in the MRI
scanner while a resting state acquisition is being made.] At the
moment of the beep she is visualizing very strongly a scene from
yesterday: she clearly innerly sees her boyfriend and his mother
on a hillside next to the lake [much like she had actually seen
them yesterday]. She sees the boyfriend in the shade, his mother
in the sun, and (blurrily) a sea of people around them. [Before the
beep she had been thinking that they look like monkeys, the way
monkeys perch in family groups.] Simultaneously she is somehow
saying to herself in her own voice something like “they do look like
monkeys.” These are words floating around but they don’t make
a full sentence. This is something like implied words rather than
actually experienced words.
Pristine experience refers to a phenomenon that at a particular
moment appears directly “before the footlights of consciousness.”
At the moment of this beep, Susan’s pristine experience includes
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(a) innerly seeing her boyfriend and his mother and (b) the inner
incompletely worded saying of something like “they do look like
monkeys.” Pristine experience does not include anything that is
not directly experienced. It therefore does not include aspects of
the current context (e.g., that Susan was lying in the scanner at
the Max Planck Institute in Berlin or the sensation of the scanner
stretcher against her back) unless those aspects are directly
apprehended; it also does not include historical facts (e.g., that
yesterday Susan was at the lake) unless somehow that fact is at the
moment directly apprehended; nor does it include impressions
(e.g., that mother and son are co-dependent) unless somehow
that impression is at the moment directly apprehended. Pristine
experience does not include putative causation (e.g., that Susan
innerly sees them because she thinks they are co-dependent)
unless that causation is at the moment directly apprehended;
and it does not include putative personality characteristics (e.g.,
that Susan is an introvert). DES calls that nearly infinite list
of potential experiences the “welter” (Hurlburt and Heavey,
2006). That is, out of all the things that could conceivably have
become part of Susan’s experience at 1:52:12 (out of the welter
of potentialities), Susan did—for whatever reason—experience
the inner seeing of the boyfriend, mother, and hillside and the
inner speaking of the incompletely worded “they do look like
monkeys.”
Distinguishing between pristine experience and all else is of
fundamental importance to the science of experience because
pristine experience (but not those alternatives) is radically non-
subjective (Hurlburt, 2011, ch. 17). Susan’s pristine experience
was private (available only to her), to be sure, and cannot be
directly verified by an external observer (who at 1:52:12 would
see only that Susan was lying quietly in the scanner). However,
at 1:52:12, whether Susan was or was not innerly seeing her
boyfriend and his mother is not a matter of subjective impression
but of (Susan’s radically non-subjective) direct apprehension.
By contrast, an impression of mother-son co-dependence (an
example from the welter of non-pristine alternatives) is not
directly apprehended at any given moment—co-dependence is
not apprehended but inferred, and that inferential process might
on other occasions lead to the mother’s overbearingness, or to the
boyfriend’s weakness, or to any of a host of more-or-less related
constructs. That is, co-dependence does not have the “either it
was or was not” characteristic that pristine experience has.
And even if Susan’s co-dependence impression could be
established, it would be difficult if not impossible to establish the
extent to which Susan’s version of co-dependence is similar to
that of others (see Skinner, 1974, and its discussion in Hurlburt
and Heavey, 2001). By contrast, we can interrogate Susan about
what she means when she says she “sees” her boyfriend at 1:52:12.
In what ways is this “seeing” similar to or different from seeing
the pencil there on the table? In what ways is this “seeing” similar
to or different from hearing Elton John’s “Candle in the Wind”
playing through your earbuds? In what ways is this “seeing”
similar to or different from tasting the chocolate candy you are
eating? With further questioning, it turns out that Susan’s inner
seeing is experientially muchmore similar to external seeing than
it is to external hearing or tasting. That kind of refinement is
not possible for the co-dependence impression (see Hurlburt and
Heavey, 2001), or the causation inference, or many of the other
potentialities in the welter.
We can (and did) perform that kind of refinement in
the interview about the inner speaking of “they do look like
monkeys.” We discovered that it was similar to speaking aloud
in that it was in Susan’s own voice. However, we discovered,
with Susan, and surprisingly to Susan herself, that the words
were not clearly defined. We discovered that there were words
involved in this experience (not merely the meanings that might
be intended); somehow Susan was saying something like these
words (that is, the experience was of speaking, not of seeing the
words, not of merely knowing that the words were present). We
discovered that this description of not-clearly-defined-words was
not merely an artifact of Susan’s rhetorical style (or of our way
of interviewing), because at other samples Susan’s descriptions of
words were unambiguously detailed...
2:14:29 pm (sample 5.3): Susan is looking at her eyes in the
scannermirror, noting the distance from her eyes to her eyebrows.
She is saying to herself, “Wish I looked like that standing,” in her
own soft inner voice with a slightly ironic or humorous tone.
This is a completely worded sentence except that the subject
“I” is implied rather than explicitly spoken; the words and their
manner of presentation (slightly ironic or humorous tone) are
unambiguously apprehended. Simultaneously, Susan is beginning
to attend to the symmetry of her eyes/eyebrows, but that is not (or
perhaps not yet) a complete thought.
2:19:02 pm (sample 5.4): [Susan had been wondering whether the
pitch in which she speaks correlates with how she feels.] At the
moment of the beep she was innerly speaking, answering that
question: “I think so,” but with the intonation of the word “think”
expressing uncertainty.
...whereas, at other samples, Susan’s thinking involved no words
at all:
11:08:44 am (sample 8.8) Susan is innerly seeing her best friend
Angie slightly in profile (with Angie’s pony tail on the right
and farther away). Susan clearly sees Angie’s face and hair but
not what she is wearing. Susan knows that Angie is standing in
front of a café or somewhere in her hometown, although the
background is blurry. At the moment of the beep Susan is also
thinking/wondering, wordlessly, something like Will we remain
besties? while simultaneously feeling love for her and missing her.
This feeling is a warmth transferring from Susan to Angie; this is
a mental not physical warmth.
As a result, the DES method applied in Hurlburt et al. (2015)
would conclude that Susan’s apprehensions of her pristine
experiences include a range of completeness in the inner
expression of words, ranging from quite completely expressed
with explicitly apprehended prosody (5.3) to innerly speaking
with implied words (5.1) to thinking without words at all (8.8).
ESTABLISHING FIDELITY
The method applied in Hurlburt et al. (2015) would further
conclude that Susan’s range of completeness was a characteristic
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of her pristine inner experience, not merely an artifact of the
data acquisition or interview process. That is, Hurlburt et al.
claimed that they had provided high fidelity descriptions of
Susan’s (and their other participants’) pristine inner experiences.
Whether such a claim should be believed lies in the center of
the chasm described above. If DES (or some other method)
actually provides high fidelity apprehensions and descriptions of
pristine inner experience, then there is a way out of the chasm:
the behaviorally inclined can require apprehensions/descriptions
whose fidelity is credible, and the experientially inclined can
acknowledge that pristine inner experience gives a glimpse
into the human condition. Currently, however, there is no
well-developed scientific strategy to evaluate a claim about
the fidelity of apprehensions/descriptions of private experience
(Price and Barrell, 2012). Many would claim that because inner
experience is private, it and descriptions thereof cannot possibly
be of high fidelity. We begin with a thought experiment.
KEY CONCEPT 6 | Fidelity
The degree to which an apprehension or a description of pristine inner
experience faithfully reflects, genuinely conveys, and non-misleadingly suggests
important features of that pristine inner experience. Fidelity’s hallmarks are
lack of distortion, misrepresentation, exaggeration, avoidance. Fidelity is not
perfection, nor is it accuracy; it is straightforwardness and reflection.
Suppose you are a deaf recording engineer, and you have
before you a recording of a symphony, its score, and some
sophisticated audio editing equipment. You wish to know
whether the recording is of high fidelity. You decide to examine
the recording from the perspective of oboes: the score tells you
that oboes should be playing at measures 21, 57, 63..., and not
playing at measures 14, 43, 67. . . . You know something about
the timbre (that is, the wave form) of oboes; you use your
equipment and discover that there is indeed something oboe-
like in measures 21, 57, 63... and not in 14, 43, 67.... Then
you decide to examine from the perspective of trumpets: the
score tells you where there are trumpets, and your equipment
shows trumpet wave forms at the specified measures. Eventually,
if you do this from a large enough sample of instrumental
perspectives and a large enough sample of measures, and make
ever more close distinctions (as between oboe and English horn),
and use ever more sophisticated equipment, because the original
recording was made without particular regard for the particular
perspectives that you have sampled, you will eventually conclude
that the recording is of high fidelity even though you yourself
cannot have any direct access to the fidelity of the recording itself.
By analogy, if apprehensions/descriptions of pristine
experience are indeed of high fidelity. It should be possible to
examine them from a variety of perspectives not specifically
intended in the original data gathering. If those not-specifically-
intended examinations show expected characteristics,
then we should take that as evidence that the original
apprehensions/descriptions were of high fidelity (In passing,
we note that it is the radically non-subjective nature of pristine
inner experience that makes this kind of multiple-perspective
exploration possible). To explore the putative fidelity of DES
apprehensions/descriptions, we proceeded in two basic steps.
First, time-locked to recordings of brain activation using
fMRI, we used DES to apprehend and then describe ongoing
experience in (putative) high fidelity—that is, we aspired
to faithful apprehensions/descriptions of phenomena as they
present themselves of themselves (Hurlburt, 2011), not skewed
or distorted. (Toward this end, the DES procedure and
its expositional interviews are “open-beginninged” Hurlburt,
2011; Hurlburt et al., 2015; that is, the procedure does not
specify in advance the feature(s) of inner experience to be
investigated. Open-beginninged-ness is a necessary feature of
fidelity, by analogy to the audio recording—the recording
does not try, a priori, to record the oboes in high fidelity,
it tries to record the audio scene as it naturally occurs in
high fidelity, which can later be listened to for any features
of interest, including oboes, trumpets, etc.). The procedure is
described in Hurlburt et al. (2015), Kühn et al. (2014), and
Hurlburt et al. (2016), and sketched briefly here. We trained
participants in 4 days of DES sampling in the participant’s
natural environment, each with its attendant 1-h expositional
(“iterative”) interview, which involved multiple co-interviewers.
Thereafter each participant underwent nine 25-min fMRI
scanner sessions, receiving four quasi-random DES beeps.
Brain activations time-locked to those beeps were recorded.
In the usual DES procedure, the co-interviewers wrote and
edited a “contemporaneous” description of each of the sampled
experiences from that session. This resulted, for each participant,
in 9 × 4 = 36 beeped attempts to apprehend in-scanner
inner experience, 36 written descriptions thereof, and 36 time-
locked fMRI brain activations. There were five such participants,
resulting in a total of 5 × 36 = 180 experiences/activations.
KEY CONCEPT 7 | Open-beginninged
Exploring whatever phenomena present themselves rather than starting with
predefined interest; a fundamental part of the bracketing of presuppositions.
The question “What, if anything, was in your experience at the moment of the
beep?” is open-beginninged because it invites apprehension of any phenomena
without favoring inner speech, imagery, sensation, or any other particular kind
of experience.
The second part of our exploration of fidelity involves,
by analogy from our deaf engineer, examining the
apprehensions/descriptions (obtained in the first part) from a
variety of perspectives not explicitly contemplated during data
collection. For example, if the interviews happen to describe
inner speaking as being ongoing at beep 7, 16, 29, 31, 84, 93, and
142 but not at the remaining beeps, and the brain activations
modeled on those particular inner-speaking beeps differ from
activations modeled on the remaining beeps in ways relevant
to speech, we have one bit of evidence in favor of fidelity of
apprehension/description. If the interviews happen to describe
visual imagery as being ongoing at particular beeps but not at
the remaining beeps, and the brain activations so modeled show
characteristics relevant to vision, we have another bit of evidence
for fidelity.
Kühn et al. (2014) explored one such perspective by noting
that the expositional interviews of one of their participants,
“Lara,” indicated that eight out of 36 samples included inner
speaking. fMRI analysis on this individual showed that the eight
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 January 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 43
Hurlburt et al. Apprehending Inner Experience with Fidelity?
inner-speaking samples were indeed accompanied by increased
activity in left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), a main element of
the speech network established by other fMRI studies. That
result can be interpreted as a bit of evidence in favor of the
credible fidelity of the apprehension/description of Lara’s pristine
experience because, during the sampling procedure, we had not
been especially interested in Lara’s inner speaking. When the
expositional interviews identified eight in-scanner moments that
happened to involve inner speaking, we could make a risky
prediction that brain activation relevant to speaking had been
ongoing at those moments: a prediction that was subsequently
confirmed. Such evidence is not conclusive: it is possible, for
example, that Lara had been speaking aloud at those moments
but denied it in the interviews. Replications are required to
distinguish among such possibilities.
Fidelity in general involves the potential for refinement of
detail, and this study allowed such refinement with respect to
inner speaking. Lara’s experience, as putatively revealed in the
expositional interviews, included a continuum of the manner
in which she apprehended inner words, ranging from innerly
spoken to innerly heard. Lara’s brain activity during those
moments claimed to be of inner speaking, when contrasted
to moments claimed to be innerly hearing her own voice,
showed increased activity in left IFG. This is another bit of
evidence in favor of the credibility of the fidelity of the DES
apprehensions/descriptions.
Hurlburt et al. (2016) re-examined these data (including data
of five participants) from a somewhat different perspective. On
the first day of participation in the study (and prior to any
DES involvement, participants had been placed in the scanner
and asked to complete five typical in-scanner tasks such as:
form a mental image of a pencil, imagine hearing a tinkling,
feel anxiety, feel a shiver, and innerly say “elephant.” Then DES
training and sampling in the scanner was performed as described
above. Hurlburt et al. showed that of the 180 in-scanner samples
across all participants, the expositional interviews identified 52
that involved spontaneous inner speaking (recall that this study
was open-beginninged—we had not specifically targeted inner
speaking). The brain activation that had been recorded during
those 52 moments could be compared to the brain activation
that had been recorded from the same participants during the
task-elicited inner speech (e.g., say “elephant”). Whereas task-
elicited inner speech was associated with decreased activation
in Heschl’s gyrus (and also left IFG increase), spontaneous
inner speech was associated with increased Heschl’s gyrus
activation. That was surprising because Heschl’s gyrus is a brain
area usually understood to be involved in hearing. Because
activations in a targeted brain region differentiated between
task-elicited and spontaneous inner speaking, this result can be
interpreted as another bit of evidence in favor of the fidelity of
apprehension/description of pristine (spontaneous) experience.
Recalling that fidelity involves the potential for refinement of
detail, the putative fidelity of the descriptive procedure allowed
the investigators to notice that some of those 52 moments
of inner speaking also (simultaneously) involved prominent
inner characteristics not related to speaking (visual imagery,
for example), and other samples were of moments where the
participant and/or the interviewers were not confident that inner
speaking had been ongoing. Those samples could be removed
from the analysis, resulting in 20 samples where the investigators
were confident that inner speaking was the most prominent
aspect. The fMRI analysis was repeated for those 20 samples, with
results similar to the 52-moment results. This is another bit of
evidence in favor of the fidelity of apprehension/description of
pristine experience.
In sum: if apprehensions/descriptions of inner experience are
indeed of high fidelity, then it should be possible to “mine”
those apprehensions/descriptions from a variety of perspectives
not explicitly considered when the apprehensions/descriptions
were created. For one example, Smallwood and colleagues
(Smallwood, 2011; Smallwood et al., 2012) have proposed
that the fluctuation between task-centered cognition and mind
wandering involves switching between neural networks that
process the externally imposed environmental task and different
networks that process internally generated information. If the
Hurlburt et al. (2016) apprehensions/descriptions are of high
fidelity, it should be possible to re-examine their samples
from an internal/external perspective and then determine
whether the corresponding brain activations match Smallwood’s
theoretical predictions. A similar process could be undertaken
for any theory that claims a link between experience and brain
activity.
DISCUSSION
We have made the case that apprehending and describing
inner experience in high fidelity is important to science, and
therefore that it will be necessary for science to figure out how
to evaluate the credibility of claims about fidelity. We have
discussed one potential avenue for evaluating such claims—
examining fMRI data frommultiple experiential perspectives not
originally contemplated when the data were collected. We intend
this discussion to be a small step in an important direction,
more about raising potentialities than of establishing results, but
we suggest there are enough bits of evidence to suggest that
the fidelity of apprehensions/descriptions can be productively
explored by examining and re-examining pairings of moments of
experience and brain activations in multiple ways from multiple
perspectives.
The DES studies described here are expensive in terms of time,
expertise, and equipment. It is reasonable to ask whether such
studies are worth science’s effort. It seems to us that fundamental
principles are at stake. High fidelity apprehensions/descriptions
of experience are necessary to examine claims that form the
basis of consciousness science (such as that inner speech is
ubiquitous), are important in advancing science’s understanding
of brain function (such as that inner speaking and inner hearing
have different neural signatures), and may be useful in refining
constructs that have been suggested by other programmes of
research (such as Smallwood’s internal/external theory).
Hurlburt et al. (2016) suggest another implication of high-
fidelity data collection. The power of a statistical test is essentially
the effect size times the sample size divided by the experimental
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error. Most fMRI studies attain adequate power by using a large
sample size to increase the numerator. However, it may also
be possible (as described above) to attain adequate power by
selecting more experientially homogeneous samples to decrease
the denominator experimental error. It was the high fidelity
data collection that made it possible to notice that of the 52
samples that included inner speaking, only 20 involved inner
speaking as the most salient characteristic. It was then possible
to use only those 20 samples, thus making the experiences more
homogeneous and thereby reducing the experimental error. Such
refinement wouldmost likely not be possible without high fidelity
apprehensions/descriptions.
Many observers have suggested the desirability of versions
of DES that involve less time and less expertise (e.g., Froese
et al., 2011; Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015; McAuliffe and
McGann, 2016). Alternatively, it might be observed that fidelity
considerations suggest the desirability that science spend more
of its resources in cultivating methods that seek to provide high
fidelity observations. A mature science of experience would work
through the situations in which each would be desirable.
It is not our intention to contend that DES is the epistemic
tribunal against which all methods of introspection should be
judged (Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel, 2011). Other traditions
have also shown the usefulness of combining disciplined
first-person approaches with neuroscience, for example the
neurophenomenology of Varela (1996) and colleagues, the
visual perception studies of Lutz et al. (2002), the seizure
anticipation experience of Petitmengin et al. (2006), and the
expectation explorations of Price and Barrell (2012). Our aim is
to encourage discussion of first-person fidelity and the criteria for
establishing it.
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